Often the core di culty in designing zero-knowledge protocols arises from having to consider every possible cheating veri er trying to extract additional information. We here consider a compiler which transforms protocols proven secure only with respect to the honest veri er into protocols which are secure against any even cheating veri er. Such a compiler, which preserves the zero-knowledge property of a statistically or computationally secure protocol was rst proposed in BMO based on Discrte Logarithm problem. In this paper, we show h o w such a compiler could be constructed based on any one-way permutation using the recent method of interactive hashing OVY-91 . This applies to both statistically and computationally secure protocols, preserving their respective security. Our result allows us to utilize DES-like permutations for such a compiler.
Introduction
An interactive proof involves two communicating parties, a prover and a veri er. The prover is computationally unbounded; alternatively, in applications, it is a polynomial-time machine possessing additional private knowledge. It tries to convince the probabilistic polynomial time veri er that a given theorem is true.
A zero-knowledge ZK proof is an interactive proof with an additional privacy constraint: the veri er does not learn why the theorem is true GMR . That is, whatever the polynomialtime veri er sees in a ZK-proof with the unbounded prover of a true theorem x, can be approximated by a probabilistic polynomial-time machine working solely on input x. A statistical zero-knowledge proof SZK proof is one for which this true view and approximate view are information-theoretically indistinguishable.
A methodology suggested in BMO is to design statistical or computational zero-knowledge protocols by assuming a canonical behavior of the veri er, and then translate such protocols to those where cheating is allowed. The mechanism proposed there, as well as the one in GKa, NY for computational zero-knowledge proofs only uses speci c algebraic assumptions to achieve it.
The task of nding the necessary and su cient complexity conditions needed for various primitives has attracted a lot of work, showing that many primitives, originally based on speci c algebraic functions, need only one-way functions or permutations. For example, pseudo-random generators BM-84 , secure signature schemes GoMiRi , computational ZKproofs GMR w ere shown to be equivalent to the existence of general one-way functions ILL, Ha-90, NY, Ro, OW . Such e orts, not only develop the theoretical foundations of cryptography, but also enable the primitive implementations to be based on a larger possible concrete choices of underlying functions, thus making them more plausible.
The method of interactive hashing has been recently developed in OVY-91 and applied OVY-91, N O VY to zero-knowledge arguments and information theoretically secure Oblivious Transfer protocols also to commitments by to powerful non-polynomial parties OVY-92 . Here we show an extended use of this method with zero-knowledge protocols to provide a ZK-protocol design tool along the line of BMO , but based on the existence of any one-way permutation. In particular, assuming that one-way permutations exist, we show that if a language L has a honest-veri er statistical zero-knowledge proof, then L has a general statistical zero-knowledge proof. We remark that our method applies to computational zero-knowledge as well. Previously, speci c algebraic assumptions were needed in order to implement such tools BMO, GKa, NY .
Organization of the paper
In section 2, we give the model and de nitions. In Section 3, we present the main result on compiling protocols zero-knowledge against a honest veri er to general zero-knowledge protocols, and we show some implications. Section 4 outlines the compiler and its proof.
De nitions
We use standard notions of Turing machines TM and probabilistic polynomial time TM's PPT, and interactive T uring machines GMR . We adopt the standard de nition of computational and statistical indistinguishability see, for example, ILL, GMR . Let us recall de nitions of interactive proofs and zero-knowledge proofs, introduced and formalized in GMR .
We assume that prover P is a probabilistic, in nite power, interactive TM and veri er V is a probabilistic, poly-time interactive TM GMR . We consider interactions between P and V , where they share the same input and can communicate. We s a y P convinces V to accept on x if P and V have common input x, and after the interaction V accepts. Let view of V be the transcript of the conversation between P and V which consists of all the messages between P and V and the portion of the random tape used by V i.e. random coin tosses of V .
P and V form an interactive protocol for language L with security parameter k k is the length of the input string, if the following two conditions are satis ed:
Completeness: F or all x 2 L, P convinces V to accept with probability greater than 1 , 1 2 k , where probability is taken over coin tosses of P and V .
Soundness: F or all P 0 and for all x 6 2 L probability that P 0 convinces V to accept on x is less than 1 2 k .
IP= PS PA C E is the class of languages which can be accepted satisfying completeness and soundness conditions.
The zero-knowledge property:
For every PPT veri er V 0 let M V 0 be the probabilistic poly-time TM. The goal of M V 0 is to simulate the view of V 0 , i.e. the conversation between P and V 0 on x. As such, it must produce a pair: random tape used by V 0 , conversation between P and V 0 . W e restrict our simulators to be average-PPT TM. An interactive protocol is Statistical Zero-Knowledge if for all V 0 there exists M V 0 2 PPTsuch that for all x 2 L, the distributions of the conversation between P and V 0 on x and M V 0 x is statistically close. If the two distributions are computationally indistinguishable, this corresponds to Computational Zero-Knowledge.
Zero-knowledge with respect to honest veri er:
Finally, w e are ready to specify what does it mean to have a protocol which w orks for honest veri er only. A n i n teractive protocol is Statistical Zero-Knowledge for Honest Veri er if for the honest V i.e. the one speci ed in the description of P;V there exists M V 2 PPTsuch that for all x 2 L, the distributions of the conversation between P and V on x and M V x are statistically close. Similar de nition holds for Computational Zero-Knowledge Protocols for Honest Veri er.
Let f be a length preserving function f : f0; 1g ! f0; 1g computable in polynomial time.
De nition 2.1 One-way function. f is one-way if for every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, for all polynomials p and all su ciently large n, Pr f x = f A f x j x 2 R f0; 1g n 1=pn:
If addition, if f is a permutation on f0; 1g n ; n 0, then we s a y that f is a one-way permutation. The above de nition is of a strong one-way function. Its existence is equivalent to the existence of the weak one-way function Y82 ; a stronger equivalence is possible in the case of permutations see GILVZ . A weak one-way function has the same de nition as above, except the probability of successful inversion above i s 1 , 1 =n c ; c 0.
Main Result
We show that if there is any one-way permutation, then honest veri er zero knowledge" is in fact just as strong as zero-knowledge.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose a one-way permutation exists. If a language L has an honest veri er statistical respectively computational zero knowledge protocol, then L has a statistical respectively computational zero knowledge protocol.
We remark that our transformation is constructive and that error probabilities are preserved, as in BMO , it also works for zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.
Implications
The theorem has a few implications on languages and their proof systems beyond giving a design tool. We discuss those brie y.
Black-box simulation: Oren Or formalized the black b o x notion by s a ying that the simulator is a PPT oracle machine M which when asked to simulate a particular veri er b V is given that veri er as an oracle. Thus the same simulator works for all veri ers. Using our method we show that assuming any one-way permutation, black b o x simulation is not a restriction on zero-knowledge, i.e.: Suppose L has a honest veri er SZK ZK protocol and one-way permutation exists. Then, L has a black b o x simulation SZK ZK protocol.
Error probability one-sidedness : Goldreich, Mansour and Sipser GMS de ne a one-sided proof system to be one in which completeness holds with probability 1 that is the prover can always convince the veri er. An implication of our protocol tool is: If L has a honest veri er SZK proof system and one-way permutation exists. Then, L has a SZK one-sided proof system.
The Protocol Compiler and its Proof
Given a zero-knowledge for honest veri er proof system P ;V, we h a v e to construct another prover veri er pair P;V such that P;V is still an interactive proof system for L and for Remark: The bit commitment protocol parties are e cient, i.e. they need only perform polynomial time computations to execute the protocol.
Commit to a bit a 1. The veri er V selects x 2 R f0; 1g n at random and computes y fx. V keeps both x and y secret from P.
2. The prover P selects h 1 ; h 2 ; : : : h n , 1 2 f 0 ; 1 g n such that each h i is a random vector over GF 2 such that h 1 ; h 2 ; : : : h n , 1 are linearly independent o v er GF 2 3. For j from 1 to n , 1 P sends h j to V . V sends r j Bh j ; y t o P where Bu; v is the bit resulting as the inner product of u and v. This committal reveals to P nothing about the committed bit in the informationtheoretic sense. On the other hand, V cannot later decommit to a value other than the one it committed without inverting a one-way permutation on a random challenge.
Next we present the compiler.
Compiler Protocol 1. V picks a sequence a i ; 1 i 2t of random bits, and commits to them using Interactive
Hashing. The commitment can be done in parallel for all bits.
2. P chooses at random t-subset of f1; : : : ; 2 t gand asks V to decommit bits a j for j in the subset. Let a 0 i ; itbe the subsequence of unopened bits. 3. P picks t bits b 1 ; : : : ; b t at random and sends them to V . 4. V lets c i = b i a 0 i and C = c 1 c 2 c 3 : : : c t be its secret random tape string.
5. P;V execute an old P ;V protocol with V , running an V , but using C as its secret coin ips. Moreover, for every message sent from V to P is accompanied by a zeroknowledge argument that V would really have sent this message if its coin ips were C.
Remark: Such a proof is possible and users are engaged in Interactive Hashing based on one-way permutation NOVY as a subroutine.
More speci cally, V begins by sending the message 1 that would have been the rst message V sent on coins C, and proves that indeed it has done this. The prover checks this proof, and if it is incorrect it aborts. Otherwise it sends whatever response 1 the old prover P would have sent. This continues till the proof ends. The available strongly committed bits, and the speci cation of the original protocols are the witness to the proofs communicated.
Proof of correctness
We h a v e to prove completeness, soundness and the zero-knowledge property.
Completeness: For all x in L, the prover can still convince the veri er, since the success probability of the new P is essentially equivalent to the old one by the simple fact that it is following the protocol.
Soundness: Interactive hashing hides committed bits in the information-theoretic sense, and thus the prover does not get any information about the random tape of the veri er other then what follows from the original protocol during the initialization stage. Since all the subsequent rounds use zero-knowledge arguments of NOVY in addition to the messages of the old protocol, the soundness follows.
Zero-knowledge property: The simulator below proves this. We concentrate on statistical zero-knowledge here. The computational case is similar. First, our new simulator runs the old simulator for honest veri er in order to obtain a pair C; 1 1 : : : m m consisting of coin tosses of the honest veri er C = c 1 c 2 : : : c t and the transcript 1 1 : : : m m of the conversation between the prover and the honest veri er. The new simulator, will now transform with very high probability this old transcript for honest veri er into one which is statistically close to the conversation between new prover veri er pair as follows: 1 It runs b V for step 1 to get its commitment o f a 1 ; : : : ; a 2 t , using interactive hashing.
2 At this point, the simulator uses the backtracking capability to run the protocol twice in order to learn what are the "unopened" bits. That is, it asks to reveal a random subset of t bits. Then it puts the veri er into the state it was in before the subset of t bits was requested to be revealed but after the commitments and now requests to open the complementary set of bits.
3 Having the a i , the simulator now picks b i = a i c i for all i = 1 ; : : : ; tas being the prover's response modifying bits of step 3, and has thus makes C be the secret random string for the new V . Recall that the simulator has in its possession the old conversation with coins xed to C.
The zero-knowledge arguments executed at each round force cheating veri er to generate a conversation which is statistically close to the one we produced by using the honest veri er with additional ZK arguments. The new simulator runs b
V and gets what is supposed to be V 's rst message if it had C, together with a proof i.e. a zero-knowledge argument based on interactive hashing and assuming one-way permutations exist that this is indeed the case. It examines the proof and if it is found incorrect the simulator aborts as the prover would have. But if not, then with very high probability, the message b V sent i s r e ally the message 1 that the simulator expected at this stage. And to this message it can respond: it just has to send 1 . Continuing in this way the simulator soon has a transcript of the entire conversation, which retracing through the argument is statistically close to the real conversation. That is, the simulator generates exactly the correct conversation except if: b V manages to break the commitment s c heme i.e. invert a one-way permutation, or if it is able to cheat the prover in a zero-knowledge argument which a s w ell implies it can invert a one-way permutation, given the underlying construction. Thus, we are done.
Conclusions: To summarize, we h a v e presented a uniform way to compile honest-veri er zero-knowledge protocols into general zero-knowledge ones. This gives a design method which seems to be easier than considering all possible veri ers as a starting design point. The proof has some implications to properties of languages and their proofs, and it further demonstrates a wider applicability of the recent notion of interactive hashing.
